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Abstract
We examine cumulative abnormal returns of mergers and acquisitions in the computer industry
over a twenty-day event window surrounding merger announcement. Our findings indicate that
acquirers, on average, are generally not able to capture statistically significant cumulative
abnormal returns over this event window, while targets are able to capture large, positive
statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns. We find that the premium paid by acquirers
and in turn received by targets possesses explanatory merit with regards to both acquirer and
target cumulative abnormal returns. Additionally, our results reveal that when improvement of
marketing capabilities is a stated rationale for pursuing a merger, it has statistically significantly
explanatory power of target cumulative abnormal returns.
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I. Introduction
Our study attempts to answer the question – what ex-ante characteristics of mergers and
acquisitions in the computer industry lead to the greatest short-run increases in equity values? A
couple of research findings make this question interesting for study and may provide unique
rationales that motivate merger and acquisition activity in the computer industry. Specifically,
Bothner’s finding (2005) that “…relative size has a strong positive effect on future growth…”
implies that firms in the computer industry that enhance their relative size, on average, may be
able to augment their sales growth. Additionally, Bayus, Erickson, and Jacobson’s (2003) finding
that new product introductions in the personal computer industry enhance firm profitability by
increasing firm profit rates and size provides a possible explanation for the industry’s
comparatively high rate of technological innovation.
A firm seeking to capitalize on the sales growth benefit it derives from increasing its
relative size or the profitability benefit it gains from introducing new products may find a merger
or acquisition to be the optimal means of achieving its ends. Although organic growth may also
serve as a means of attaining these benefits, and may be especially attractive to both those firms
which have reservations about their capacity to effectively integrate new businesses within their
existing management structures and to those that are generally skeptical of structuring an M&A
transaction, it typically has features which some firms may find unattractive. In particular, a
given firm may find the time required to organically grow prohibitive and/or simply lack the
expertise needed to organically grow.
For example, a US hardware producer which seeks to increase its relative size and
product offerings by launching a new software product in Asian markets will likely need to open
new Asian offices, secure new avenues of distribution, hire new staff, develop a branding and
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positioning strategy, et cetera, processes which will likely take a few years. Further, the US
hardware producer must also develop the expertise to produce software products targeted at
Asian consumers, something the firm may find to be exceptionally difficult because it does not
fall within the realm of its core competency. In the meantime, a competitor with the same desire
as the US hardware producer who completes a timely acquisition of an Asian software maker
may be able to preempt the hardware producer’s entry into the Asian software market, since an
acquisition will neither require time to secure distribution in Asian markets, open new regional
offices, hire new staff, et cetera nor require development of software expertise. Through
preemption the rival becomes the first to capture the relative size and new product introduction
benefits present in the industry, placing the hardware producer at a competitive disadvantage.
The industry may also provide acquirers with another unique benefit to engaging in a
merger or acquisition. That is, by making a given acquisition, acquirers may be able to adversely
affect the stock prices of their rivals. Akhigbe and Martin (2002) find for example that
acquisitions by Microsoft in the Internet/online-services segment of the computer industry
negatively impacted the rival Internet/online-services portfolio’s stock prices. Because of this
and the aforedescribed potential benefits that may be derived through a merger or acquisition, the
computer industry is rife with merger and acquisition activity, providing us with rich data for
analysis but limiting our study to the short-term. The statistical problem with performing a longrun analysis of equity values is that there is generally a succession of merger and acquisition
transactions for each acquirer, making it difficult to untangle the long-run effects of each
particular merger or acquisition.
To examine the question motivating our study based on the above research findings we
develop various hypotheses which are grounded in the notion that certain characteristics of
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mergers and acquisitions in the computer industry will, on balance, be statistically significant
generators of short term value. The data used to test our hypothesis mostly comes from press
releases, internet sources, SEC filings, Wharton Research Data Services, and Yahoo Finance.
Our study makes use of twenty-seven mergers and acquisitions in the hardware, software, and
networking sectors of the computer industry. For our procedure, we employ the event study
methodology over a twenty-day event window to compute cumulative abnormal returns for
targets and acquirers. Not only do we test these cumulative abnormal returns for statistical
significance from zero but we also attempt to identify those features of computer industry
mergers and acquisitions that generate value in the short-term. We do the latter by regressing
cumulative abnormal returns against various independent variables that are hypothesized to be
value creators.
Our findings indicate that acquirers, on balance, do not earn statistically significant
cumulative abnormal returns, while targets do. The premium paid/received seems to have
marginally significant explanatory merit for both acquirer and target cumulative abnormal
returns while announcing marketing as a stated rationale for pursuing a merger seems to have
statistically significant explanatory merit for target cumulative abnormal returns. Further,
pursuing a merger in the 1997-1998 time period seems to be a marginally significant creator of
short-term value for targets. We interpret our results to be in correspondence with existing crossindustry studies on the subject, implying that short-term merger and acquisition value creation in
the computer industry is generally not unique. Nevertheless, the statistical significance of
pursuing marketing as a rationale in target acquisitions may be stem from how shareholders
uniquely view computer industry targets. Future analysis may focus on explaining the
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motivations for the statistical significance of some of our variables and extending our study to
the long-run.
II. Existing Literature
It is generally a well know result that, on balance, mergers and acquisitions create
positive, statistically significant short-term abnormal returns for targets and slightly negative
abnormal returns for acquirers which are not statistically significant. For example, Andrade,
Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) find large, statistically significant abnormal returns at the 5%
significance level for targets when they use both one day event windows around merger
announcement and event windows from twenty-days before announcement to merger closing.
For acquirers, they find slightly negative abnormal returns that are not statistically significant
under each of these event windows. These results, they explain, are consistent with earlier results
from Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988).
By examining all targets and acquirers in the University of Chicago Center for Research
in Security Prices mergers and acquisitions database from 1973 to 1998, Andrade et al do not
focus their study results upon a single industry. As a result, to our knowledge, it remains an open
question whether Andrade et al’s general results are applicable to the context of specific
industries. Both Bayus, Erickson, and Jacobson’s and Bothner’s respective findings cited earlier
imply that there are benefits to firm profitability in the personal computer industry from new
product introductions and to sales growth from relative size increases, implying that acquirers
may be able derive distinctive benefits from mergers and acquisitions in the computer industry
pursued for these purposes. If this were to be the case, and if acquirers did not, on balance,
overpay for these added benefits, then they may capture statistically significant, positive value
from mergers and acquisitions in the computer industry, which Andrade et al show is not the
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case for mergers at large. Our results, discussed in more detail below, are consistent with
Andrade et al’s findings given we find that acquirers on balance do not have statistically
significant cumulative abnormal returns while targets do. A further component of our study is to
use regression analysis to identify features of mergers that explain acquirer and target cumulative
abnormal returns.
III. Hypothesis
After examining relevant press releases and other articles for twenty-seven select mergers
and acquisitions in the computer industry, we identified six rationales firms state for merging.
These rationales are product expansion or enhancement, cost synergies or economies of scale,
increase in size or capabilities of the firm, value chain enhancement, improvement of marketing
capabilities, and new market entry. Because product expansion or enhancement and increase is
the size or capabilities of the firm are the only rationales for merging which respectively yield
enhanced profitability and sales growth benefits in accordance with Bayus et al’s and Bothner’s
previously cited findings, we hypothesize that these merger rationales, ceteris paribus, will drive
the highest increases in acquirer and target equity values over a short event window around
merger announcement, relative to each of the other rationales. We expect that the four other
stated rationales for merging will not lead to as great of an increase in short term equity values
because we have not found evidence showing that they have the potential to yield enhanced
benefits in the computer industry. Importantly, the failure of the product development and
increase in size/capabilities rationales to yield statistically significant short-term value would not
necessarily contradict previous findings that new product introductions and relative size
increases generate benefits. Rather, it might simply indicate that the market is not aware of these
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findings and as such does not anticipate potential benefits that may accrue from mergers with
these rationales and price them into short-term equity valuations.
Additionally, we expect mergers where lower premiums (by premium we mean the
difference between offer price and target equity value) are anticipated to create relatively higher
increases in acquirer equity values and relatively lower increases in target equity values, with the
opposite holding true as well. The logic motivating this is that, ceteris paribus, the lower the
premium paid by the acquirer, the lower the value paid out of the firm, and the lower the value
paid out of the firm, the higher the equity value retained within the firm. Analogously, the lower
the premium received by the target, the lower value paid into the firm, and the lower the value
paid into the firm, the lower the equity value infused into the firm.
We examine three different sectors of the computer industry – hardware, networking, and
software and hypothesize that mergers which are undertaken for diversification purposes (i.e.
which have the purpose of diversifying by introducing new products or entering new markets) in
the software segment of the computer industry will generate the greatest short-term value since
software firms generally can diversify at the lowest cost. For example, if a software firm seeks to
diversify its product line by launching a new product, it may acquire another, smaller software
firm that is particularly adept at research and development to assist in this endeavor. After the
combined firm develops a new product, the marginal cost of producing that product is negligible
as it essentially comprises the value of the disk on which the software is produced. Further,
should the firm wish to geographically diversify by selling its new product in new markets, it
faces relatively low product transport costs as it is only required to transport several small disks
for sale in its new market.
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Conversely, hardware and networking firms which make acquisitions for similar
purposes face higher costs in diversifying. A hardware firm that acquires another hardware
producer with particular research and development expertise to design a new line of computers
faces higher marginal costs as it must assemble the new computer’s keyboard, screen, CPU,
circuitry, et cetera. Further, transporting several computers to new markets will certainly come at
greater cost than transporting several small disks. Consequently, we expect product and
geographic diversification to generally come at greater cost for hardware firms than they do for
software firms.
Similarly, a networking firm that acquires another networking firm to design a new line
of network switches faces higher marginal costs, as it must engineer the switch’s mechanics,
circuitry, et cetera. Moreover, in addition to traditional transportation costs to new markets the
networking firm may face costs to overcome lack of infrastructural development in rural areas or
undeveloped nations. For example, a rural area or undeveloped nation may have plenty of
computer and software users though lack the infrastructural development to support a network or
the internet, meaning network switches will have little value in such a market unless the
networking firm invests in facilitating the development of the necessary infrastructure. Thus, we
anticipate that product and geographic diversification will generally come at greater cost for
networking firms than they do for software firms.
IV. Data
Our data largely stems from company press releases, internet sources, and SEC filings
which provide details on merger announcement dates, closing dates, transaction amounts, and
rationales for merging. To find historical equity valuations we used Yahoo Finance and Wharton
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Research Data Services. We compiled relevant data from these sources for twenty-seven mergers
and acquisitions in the computer industry.
V. Procedure and Methodology
To test our hypothesis we employ the event study methodology to define the dependent
variable in our statistical analysis, define our independent variables from the data, then proceed
with a multiple regression statistical procedure. Our single dependent variable shall be
cumulative abnormal returns of equity values twenty days prior to and twenty days after our
event, the announcement of each of our identified mergers. Cumulative abnormal returns refer to
the difference between the real ex-post equity return before or after the occurrence of the event
and the normal return which is anticipated in the absence of the event’s occurrence, aggregated
over the window of the event study. To illustrate, the cumulative abnormal return on day positive
two of our event window for a given merger announcement (signifying two days after the merger
announcement) is the actual return on that day minus the expected return on that day in the case
that the event did not occur, plus the sum of each of the values calculated in the same way for
days negative twenty to positive one. Because the normal return calculation is a hypothetical
estimation of what the actual return would have been absent the merger announcement, and
hence unobservable, it has been estimated using four different techniques. This then gives us four
different sets of cumulative abnormal returns for targets and for acquirers, each of which we
regress against our sets of dependent variables, searching for statistical significance. Those
variables that are statistically significant and invariant to the normal return estimation
methodology are robust.
Specifically, the four techniques we use to compute normal returns involve an
approximate one-year mean daily return from approximately one year prior to the announcement
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date, an approximate three-year daily mean return from approximately one year prior to the
announcement date, a daily return predicted by the capital asset pricing model for approximately
one year prior to the year of announcement, and an index daily return. The approximate one-year
mean return from approximately one year prior to the announcement date was computed by
taking the mean of all of the daily returns from approximately two years prior to the
announcement date to approximately one year prior to the announcement date for a given target
or acquirer. This number was then used as the normal return for each day in our twenty-day
event window. Similarly, to compute an approximate three-year mean return from approximately
one year prior to the announcement date, the mean of all the daily returns from approximately
four years prior to the announcement date to approximately one year prior to the announcement
date was taken for a given target or acquirer. This value was then utilized as the normal return
for each day in our twenty-day event window.
To approximate the normal return using the capital asset pricing model, the beta one year
prior to the year of announcement was found for a given target or acquirer from Wharton
Research Data Services. The annual market risk premium and risk free rate for that year were
then found from the data library on Kenneth R. French’s website.1 Using this data and the capital
asset pricing model equation: RI = Rf + Вi(Rm-Rf) normal annual returns were derived. To
convert these normal returns from annual form to daily form the number of trading days in each
of the years prior to the year of announcement for each target and acquirer were found and used
to de-annualize the annual normal returns into daily normal returns. This number was then
respectively used for each target and acquirer as the normal return for each day in the twenty-day
event window surrounding merger announcement. Finally, to estimate the normal return using
the index method, the actual daily return from the AMEX Computer Technology Index for each
1

It can be accessed at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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day in our twenty day event window was used as the normal return for that day, for each of our
targets and acquirers. Using the actual daily return for each of the days in the twenty-day event
window for each target and acquirer, we computed four sets of cumulative abnormal returns over
the event window for each target and acquirer pursuant to the cumulative abnormal return
calculation method described earlier.
Next, we identified the various independent variables that we anticipated would influence
cumulative abnormal returns. Using the press releases and other articles we compiled in our
dataset, we classified the rational or rationales motivating each merger into six categories –
product expansion or enhancement, cost synergies or economies of scale, increase in size or
capabilities of firm, value chain enhancement, improvement of marketing capabilities, or new
market entry. Based on the products and services offered by the acquirer, we also classified each
merger as occurring in the hardware, software, or networking segments of the computer industry.
Further, given that we anticipated the premium expected to be paid in each transaction to
influence the short-term value created by that transaction, we approximated the premium
expected by the market upon announcement.
To make this calculation, using data from Wharton Research Data Services, we took the
number of shares outstanding of each target firm on day minus one of its event window (the day
before merger announcement), multiplied the number of shares outstanding by the closing price
on day minus one, then subtracted the result from the approximate transaction value for the
merger listed in press releases and other articles. We used this method because we expect
shareholders of a given acquirer or target to take note of the numerical being paid premium paid,
as opposed to making a more complex premium calculation that involves normalizing the
premium for size of the target being acquired. Nevertheless, to test the robustness of our
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regression results we also ran each of our regressions with the premium value calculated above
being normalized by the size of the target. It must be noted however that the focus of our
analysis shall be on the regressions where premiums were not normalized by size of target.
Further, given the mercurial nature of mergers and acquisitions markets over periods of
time, we expected that time period might play an important role in the short-term value created
by a merger or acquisition. As such, given that our dataset of merger announcements spans from
1995 to 2007 we computed years since 1995 for each transaction and further segmented each
transaction into two-year time-intervals (1996-1996, 1997-1998, etc.). This allowed us to run two
different sets of regressions under each of the four methods of calculating cumulative abnormal
returns for both targets and acquirers (for a total of sixteen regressions). As mentioned, we ran
these regressions again using an alternate (and in our opinion less correct) method of calculating
premiums to check for robustness. Thus, we have a total of thirty-two regressions. For
clarification, when we refer to the results of our regressions in the following sections we mean
the results of the first sixteen regressions where premium is not normalized by size of target. Any
references to the latter sixteen regressions will be made explicit. Further, the previous references
to the results in earlier sections refer to the results of the first sixteen regressions.
In the first set of regressions, each of the acquirer and target cumulative abnormal returns
were regressed against the following independent variables: a variable for premium paid, a
dummy variable for merger rationale 1 (0 if product expansion or enhancement was not a
rationale for the merger, 1 if otherwise), similar dummy variables for merger rationales 3-6,
dummy variables for industry segment (software, networking), and dummy variables for twoyear time intervals (1997-1998, 1999-2000, etc.). Notably, given that dummy variables are
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relative, we omitted merger rationale 2 from the first set of dummy variables, hardware from the
second set, and 1995-1996 from the third set.
In the second set of regressions we replaced the dummy variables for two-year time
intervals with numerical variables that account for time. Each of the acquirer and target
cumulative abnormal returns were regressed against the following independent variables: a
variable for premium paid, a dummy variable for merger rationale 1(0 if product expansion or
enhancement was not a rationale for the merger, 1 if otherwise), similar dummy variables for
merger rationales 3-6, dummy variables for industry segment (software, networking), a
numerical variable for years since 1995, and a numerical variable for years since 19952. Again,
because dummy variables are relative, we omitted merger rationale 2 from the first set of dummy
variables and hardware from the second set.
VI. Results
A. Cumulative Abnormal Return Significance and Variability
Table 1. Cumulative Abnormal Return Summary Statistics (rounded to three decimal places)

Like Andrade et al who find slightly negative abnormal returns for acquirers that are not
statistically significant, we find slightly a slightly negative average cumulative abnormal return
for acquirers in the computer industry. Further, under three of the four techniques used to
compute cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers we find these cumulative abnormal returns in
our dataset are not statistically significant at the five percent level (see appendix 1). Importantly,
though the index method of computing cumulative abnormal returns gives us a statistically
significant result at the five percent level, it is only barely statistically significant, having a p15

value of nearly four percent. Further, we find that targets in our dataset have relatively high
cumulative abnormal returns and that these returns are highly statistically significant under each
of the four techniques of computing cumulative abnormal returns (see appendix 1). This result is
also consistent with Andrade et al’s. The cumulative abnormal return variances for both
acquirers and targets are low under each of the four calculation techniques and similar to each
other, illustrating that there is not much variation from the mean in our dataset that needs to be
explained.
B. Acquirer Regression Results
See appendix 2. In general, none of the regression variables we selected have statistically
significant explanatory power under each of the two sets of regressions. The one exception is
premium paid, which is marginally significant. It is close to being statistically significant in the
regressions where we use two-year time interval dummy variables when we compute cumulative
abnormal returns using an approximate one-year mean return from approximately one year prior
to the announcement date as our normal return (p-value of approximately 0.10) and when we
when we compute cumulative abnormal returns using an approximate three-year mean return
from approximately one year prior to the announcement date (p-value of approximately 0.051). It
is statistically significant in the regression using two-year time interval dummy variables where
the cumulative abnormal return is computed using a normal return approximated by the capital
asset pricing model.
The premium is also statistically significant in regressions where time is accounted for
using years since 1995 and years since 19952 as dependant variables when the independent
variable, cumulate abnormal return, is computed using an approximate three-year mean return
from approximately one year prior to the announcement date as the normal return and when it is
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computed using a capital asset pricing model normal return. In each case the slope of the
premium is negative, though very close to zero, indicating that the higher the premium paid, the
lower the short-term value captured by the acquirer. Further, the regression results show very
low adjusted r-squared values, with r-squared often times being negative. The results for the
eight acquirer regressions where premium is computed differently do not deviate much from
these results (see appendix 4). No variables are statistically significant, including premiums in all
of the regressions. Premiums not being statistically significant under the second calculation
method was a result we expected given we anticipated that shareholders are more likely to
calculate premiums using the first method.
C. Target Regression Results
See appendix 3. In all eight regressions for targets we find that the marketing dummy
variable is statistically significant. Further, in the regressions with two-year time interval dummy
variables we find that the premium received is statistically significant when the cumulative
abnormal return is computed using an approximate one-year mean return from approximately
one year prior to the announcement date as the normal return and when it is computed using the
capital asset pricing model. In the regressions using years since 1995 and years since 19952 as
numerical variables to account for time, the premium received is statistically significant only
when the cumulative abnormal return is computed using the capital asset pricing model to derive
normal returns. In each of the other cases the premium appears to be close to being significant at
the five percent level (p-values close to 0.05 but not under it). Additionally, though the
coefficient of the premium is close zero in each of the regressions, it is slightly negative
illustrating that the higher the premium received by the target, the lower the resulting cumulative
abnormal return.
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Further, the 1997-1998 dummy variable is statistically significant in the set of regressions
with two-year time interval dummy variables when cumulative abnormal returns are computed
using an approximate one-year mean return from approximately one year prior to the
announcement date as the normal return. In the others cases within this regression set, this
variable is close to being statistically significant (p-values close to 0.05 but not under it). None of
the other variables are statistically significant. Further, the regressions seem to have fairly strong
explanatory power in certain cases, with adjusted r-squared values reaching as high as 0.59.
The regressions where premiums were computed according to the second method, where
they were normalized by the target equity value, do not yield substantially different results (see
appendix 5). The premium is statistically significant or close to being so in some cases but in
most it is not. Also the marketing variable is statistically significant in some cases and in
virtually all of the remaining cases it is close to being so (p-values close to 0.05).
VIII. Interpretation of Results
Generally, we do not find evidence to support any of our various hypotheses. That is, the
variables that were hypothesized to be contributors to short-term value are generally not
statistically significant, indicating that these variables are likely not viewed by the market at
large, at least in the short-term, to be significant generators of value. It must be stressed that this
does not indicate that these variables are not actual creators of value or profits in the short or
long-term, only that they are not viewed by the market to be value creators or destroyers in the
short-term.
A. Acquirers
The results, which are generally invariant to the technique used to compute cumulative
abnormal returns, show that acquirers in computer industry mergers do not earn statistically
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significant cumulative abnormal returns in the short-term. Given that this corresponds with
Andrade et al’s results, we can interpret that, on balance, acquirers in the computer industry are
not viewed to be able to capture any industry specific benefits we hypothesized may exist to
create significant positive short-term value for their equity holders. It is not surprising then that
our regressions yield low adjusted r-squared values and that only a single variable has any iota of
explanatory merit. In fact, the dearth of variables with statistically significant explanatory power
can be accounted for by the fact that there are no statistically significant cumulative abnormal
returns to explain for acquirers in the first place (except in the case where cumulative abnormal
returns are computed using index returns for normal returns).
In certain cases the premium paid by the acquirer is statistically significant or close to
being so, suggesting that the premium paid by the acquirer is taken into consideration by the
market to explain short term return variability. However, because the variable is neither
statistically significant in all cases nor highly statistically significant, it does not seem to have
major explanatory merit (though it clearly has some). The negative coefficient of the premium
also follows basic intuition, as acquirers pay more for the firm they are acquiring, they retain less
value for themselves. Further, the lack of statistical significance among the remaining variables
is a likely indicator that they are not viewed by the market to be contributors to short-term value
in mergers and acquisitions undertaken by acquirers.
B. Targets
Happily, the results for targets are also generally invariant to the technique used to
compute cumulative abnormal returns, indicating their robustness. Average cumulative abnormal
returns are very high, ranging from approximately 25% to approximately 30% (see table 1)
depending on the technique used and are highly statistically significant under all of the
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techniques used to compute cumulative abnormal returns (see appendix 1). This finding, in
addition to the fact that these returns have low variances, indicates that targets in the computer
industry, on average, earn large statistically significant positive returns with little variation.
Our regression results regarding the significance of the marketing variable, indicate that
when marketing is one of the reasons stated by the acquirer for pursing a merger, short-term
equity value is created (i.e. marketing has statistically significant explanatory merit with regards
to explaining cumulative abnormal returns). Product enhancement, increases in size, value chain
improvement, and new market entry are traditional rationales for engaging in mergers and given
that they are not statistically significant relative to cost synergies (the omitted dummy variable),
they are apparently not viewed by the market in the short-term to be significant creators of value.
One possible explanation of marketing’s statistical significance may have to do with the nature
of firms in the industry. Firms in the hardware, software, and networking spaces of the computer
industry may possess various technical competencies in product development, cost cutting, size,
value chain, and new markets that allow them to create products for which there is demand.
However, given their devotion to technical competency, such firms may be perceived by the
market to lack marketing expertise. When an acquirer states that it is acquiring such a firm for its
marketing capabilities, this information may serve as evidence to the market that the target firm
possesses marketing capabilities, which other firms like it are perceived to lack. This may serve
as a signal that the target has a source of unique competitive advantage, leading to positive shortterm cumulative abnormal returns.
Conversely, an acquirer who acquires a target for marketing reasons may not find the
marketing variable to be statistically significant for two reasons. First, acquirers generally do not
earn statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns so there is little for the marketing
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rationale to explain. Second, even if stating marketing as a rationale for pursuing a merger
signals to the target firm shareholders that it has a unique competitive advantage, acquirer firm
shareholders may have doubts about their firm’s ability to effectively integrate that competitive
advantage into their own firm to create value.
Our results also show that premium received in certain cases has statistically significant
explanatory power and in virtually all the remaining cases is close to being statistically
significant. This indicates that the premium received by the target is an indicator of short term
value to the market though only a marginal indicator. One interesting result is that in all cases the
premium received by the target is slightly negative but very close to zero. This means that on
average, the higher the premium received by the target, the lower the resulting cumulative
abnormal return for the target. While this result may seem perplexing at first, high premiums
received may be indicative of something else. Perhaps high premiums are paid for targets that
have greater competitive advantages and value (i.e. superior management, better product
development, et cetera). As such, in the event that they do not get any ownership of the merged
firm (all cash deal), target firm shareholders may prefer not to merge and to rather reap the
rewards of such competitive advantages well into the future. Alternatively, in the event that they
do attain ownership in the merged firm, they may be skeptical about the merged firm’s ability to
uphold the target’s competitive advantage(s). These potential detriments that may be associated
with a higher premium received may outweigh the benefit of receiving a higher premium.
Further, in the regressions with two-year time intervals, the 1997-1998 time interval is
statistically significant when cumulative abnormal returns are computed using normal returns
that involve taking the mean daily return from approximately two years before the announcement
date to approximately one year before the announcement date. In all of the other cases in this
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regression set the 1997-1998 time interval was not statistically significant though it came close to
being so (p-values close to 0.05). This may signal that the boom years of 1997 and 1998
positively impacted mergers and acquisitions cumulative abnormal returns, given that the slope
is positive in each case, though that impact was not large. Additionally, the fact that none of the
other variables were statistically significant indicates that they do not have statistically
significant explanatory power over cumulative abnormal returns in targets.
IX. Motivations for Future Analysis
Many of the variables that we hypothesized would have explanatory merit, did not end up
doing so. As such, future analysis may attempt to identify variables that explain some of the
variation that we have left unexplained. Additionally, for the variables that we have found to
have explanatory merit, future analysis may attempt to diagnose the sources of that merit. For
example, we have speculated why the marketing variable may have a high degree of statistical
significance. Future research may find evidentiary justification for the possible explanations we
have offered. Finally, we have explained the statistical complexities of performing a long-term
analysis of value due to the succession of merger and acquisition activity that persists in the
industry. Future researchers may attempt to perform such an analysis.
X. Conclusion
Prior researchers have found that mergers and acquisitions, on balance, do not create
statistically significant abnormal returns over the short term for acquirers while they do create
statistically significant positive abnormal returns for targets. In our analysis we hypothesized that
this result may not hold for acquirers in the computer industry, given the industry’s unique
features that we thought may provide acquirers with additional sources of value in mergers and
acquisitions that they pursue. Additionally, after identifying certain value creating attributes
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present in the computer industry based on previous research, we hypothesized that mergers that
are pursued with a desire to attain or enhance these attributes would on balance create greater
short-term value than mergers that are not aimed at taking advantage of such attributes. We also
hypothesized that mergers undertaken for diversification purposes in the software sector of the
computer industry would create more short-term value, on average, than mergers undertaken for
these purposes in other segments.
To test these hypotheses we began by defining our dependent variable, cumulative
abnormal returns with a twenty-day event window (the event being the announcement of each
merger in our dataset) pursuant to the event study methodology. For robustness, we
approximated normal returns, or hypothetical returns that would have persisted in the absence of
the merger using four different techniques. Given that the normal return is an input into the
cumulative abnormal return calculation, this gave us four sets of cumulative abnormal returns for
targets and for acquirers. We then ran two sets of regressions with various independent variables
against each cumulative abnormal return set for targets and for acquirers. Also for robustness
sake we ran each set of regressions again using an alternate method of computing premiums paid
by acquirers and received by targets and found that this did not materially affect our results. We
focused our analysis on the sixteen regressions using the primary method for calculating
premiums, given we believe that it is the more academically correct method for the purposes of
this study.
Given this focus, our results revealed that acquirers generally do not earn statistically
significant cumulative abnormal returns while targets do earn large, positive, statistically
significant cumulative abnormal returns. This result is consistent with the aforementioned
findings of prior researchers. As such, it seems that acquirers in the computer industry, on
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balance, are not able to attain greater short-term value from mergers and acquisitions than are
acquirers across a basket of industries. Targets, on the other hand, are able to capture significant
short-term value from mergers and acquisitions in the computer industry as are targets across a
basket of industries. Additionally, our regression results are generally invariant to the cumulative
abnormal return calculation technique used and hence generally robust.
For acquirers we find that the only variable that has serious explanatory merit is the
premium they pay for targets, given that it is either statistically significant or close to being so in
some of the regressions. None of the other variables are statistically significant. This result is not
surprising for acquirers given the finding that there generally are no statistically significant
cumulative abnormal returns to explain in the first place. For targets, which do have statistically
significant cumulative abnormal returns to explain, we find that the premium plays a similar
explanatory role to the role it played in explaining acquirer cumulative abnormal returns.
Further, the dummy variable for marketing is generally statistically significant for targets,
illustrating that when the acquirer states that marketing is one of the rationales for undertaking a
given merger, that rationale is viewed by the market to be a significant short-term creator of
value. In the regressions with two-year time interval dummies the 1997-1998 variable seems to
have marginal statistical significance for targets, perhaps reflecting the positive economic
conditions persisting at the time. Future analysis may attempt to discover factors that better
explain cumulative abnormal returns, provide explanations for why the variables we identified as
having explanatory merit do have this merit, and extend our analysis to the long run.
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XII. Appendices
Appendix 1. Cumulative Abnormal Return Tests of Statistical Significance

We test for significance using a paired, two-tailed t-test. We use each of the cumulative
abnormal returns as the first dataset and compare the against the expected cumulative abnormal
return which would have persisted had the merger had no abnormal return impact (hence E[No
Impact] is zero). For acquirers cumulative abnormal returns are statistically significant only
under the index method of computing cumulative abnormal returns. For targets, cumulative
abnormal returns are all highly statistically significant and invariant to the cumulative abnormal
return calculation technique used (see target results on next page).
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Appendix 2. Acquirer Regression Results – First Premium Calculation Method
Regressions with Two-Year Time Intervals
One-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

27

Three-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

28

Capital Asset Pricing Model Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

29

Index Method Cumulative Abnormal Return

30

Regressions with Years since 1995 and Years since 19952
One-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

31

Three-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

32

Capital Asset Pricing Model Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

33

Index Method Cumulative Abnormal Return
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Appendix 3. Target Regression Results – First Premium Calculation Method
Regressions with Two-Year Time Intervals
One-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

35

Three-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

36

Capital Asset Pricing Model Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

37

Index Method Cumulative Abnormal Return
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Regressions with Years since 1995 and Years since 19952
One-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

39

Three-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

40

Capital Asset Pricing Model Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

41

Index Method Cumulative Abnormal Return
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Appendix 4. Acquirer Regression Results – Second Premium Calculation Method
Regressions with Two-Year Time Intervals
One-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

43

Three-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

44

Capital Asset Pricing Model Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

45

Index Method Cumulative Abnormal Return
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Regressions with Years since 1995 and Years since 19952
One-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

47

Three-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

48

Capital Asset Pricing Model Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

49

Index Method Cumulative Abnormal Return
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Appendix 5. Target Regression Results – Second Premium Calculation Method
Regressions with Two-Year Time Intervals
One-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

51

Three-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

52

Capital Asset Pricing Model Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

53

Index Method Cumulative Abnormal Return

54

Regressions with Years since 1995 and Years since 19952
One-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

55

Three-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

56

Capital Asset Pricing Model Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique

57

Index Method Cumulative Abnormal Return
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